Goonism and political violence in by-elections: A brewing recipe for anarchy

The by-elections on Thursday November 27, 2025 witnessed seemingly coordinated violence in Kasipul, Malava, Chwele, and parts of Kisii that exposes a dangerous trend that Kenya continues to flirt with but has never fully confronted, the creeping normalisation of political violence.

What unfolded across these electoral units, stone-throwing gangs, violent attacks, burning of vehicles by armed youths, intimidation of voters and polling officials was not merely a disruption of local polls. It was a stark warning about the fragility of Kenya’s democratic architecture and the volatility that can be unleashed when goonism becomes a legitimate tool of political contestation.

Political violence is neither new nor surprising in Kenya’s electoral landscape. What is alarming, however, is its increasing sophistication and the open involvement of political actors who bankroll and coordinate gangs to tilt the electoral process as the country heads towards 2027 general elections.

The scenes witnessed in these by-elections illustrate how political competition has mutated from policy-driven contests into battles of physical intimidation, voter suppression and curtailing alternative voices. It is basically a total collapse of democratic ideals.

When candidates resort to violence to demonstrate power or secure victory, democracy ceases to be a battle of ideas and becomes a battlefield of coercion.

At the centre of this crisis is the failure of institutions tasked with safeguarding election integrity.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), police units, and local administrators appeared ill-prepared or unwilling to confront hired thugs who roamed freely around polling stations.

In some areas, voting was disrupted for hours as security agencies hesitated to enforce order, raising legitimate concerns about political interference. When the institutions responsible for neutralising violence appear compromised or intimidated, the perpetrators gain confidence, and voters lose trust.

The implications are profound. Allowing goonism to fester erodes public confidence in electoral fairness, discourages voter participation, and deepens ethnic and political rivalries. It creates an atmosphere where only the bold or the armed dare to vote. In the long term, such conditions can catalyse widespread instability.

Kenya’s past is littered with examples of how low-level election violence escalated into national crises when left unchecked. The 2007–08 post-election violence did not emerge from a vacuum; it was preceded by repeated localised clashes that were ignored or normalised.

What is particularly troubling is the casual acceptance of violence as part of political strategy. Political parties rarely punish members linked to thuggery. Police rarely arrest masterminds—only disposable foot soldiers. Electoral offenders return to campaigns in the next cycle without consequences. This impunity signals to political actors that violence works and will not be punished. It also emboldens gangs, who increasingly view election seasons as opportunities for income and influence.

To avert looming chaos, Kenya must urgently confront this culture of violence. First, security agencies must be insulated from political capture. Elections should not be security blind spots where criminals operate with impunity. The National Police Service should treat electoral violence as organised crime, not mere disorderly conduct. Proactive intelligence gathering, mapping of known political gangs, and surveillance of financiers are essential.

Second, the IEBC must re-evaluate its enforcement capacity. Electoral laws are robust on paper, but weak implementation renders them meaningless. Candidates linked to violence should be disqualified, and parties held liable for their agents’ misconduct. Without consequences, reforms are cosmetic.

Third, civic education is critical. Voters must reject leaders who normalise violence. Communities must see that the cost of embracing thuggery is far greater than the short-term gains offered by politicians. In areas where violence recurred during these by-elections, youths were not just victimsthey were participants. Empowering them economically and politically can reduce their susceptibility to political manipulation.

Lastly, Kenya must foster a political culture that values issue-based campaigns. As long as politics remains a zero-sum contest for access to state resources, violence will remain a preferred tool for those unwilling to win through persuasion.

The violence witnessed in Kasipul, Malava, Chwele, and Kisii should not be dismissed as isolated by-election incidents. They are symptoms of a deeper malaise, one that, if ignored, could metastasise into national instability as the country heads toward future polls. Kenya must urgently reclaim its democracy from the grip of goonism before the cost becomes irreversibly high.