How the September 2013 Badru Nairobi Operation transformed anti-terror operations in the country

In 2011, two years before the Westgate Mall terror attack that occurred on September 21, 2013 and commemorated the day before yesterday, the Al Shabaab terrorists had identified the mall as a potential target.

The following year, at least two foreign intelligence services had picked up communication that suggested that the terrorists were planning a major attack in Nairobi.

This report was shared with the agencies, including the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI). On Sunday September 21, Kenya will mark the twelfth anniversary of the attack that claimed 70 lives and left dozens of others injured.

The attack, commonly referred to as Badru Nairobi Operation, was a turning point in the manner in which the security agencies shared intelligence and responded to subsequent attacks among other things.

Though there was sufficient intelligence on the planned terror attack, the security agencies not only failed to thwart it but also to conduct a coordinated and swift response to the attack.

The attack that lasted four days raised critical concerns, including the inability of the officers to respond immediately after the attack, the lack of a clear policy on how to respond to such attacks, and lack of uniform information exchange among the various agencies. In the confusion, an officer became a victim of a friendly fire.

There were also glaring gaps on policies regarding timely deployments, considering the fact that it took over one hour for the security agencies to respond to the attack.

There was also no clear policy framework on intelligence sharing between the state security organs. As a result, the security agencies’ response was haphazard and uncoordinated leading to a four-day standoff.

The siege was laid by Khatab Al Kene, Mohamed Hassan Dhuhulow, Umar Al Mogadish and Omar Nabhan.

However, lessons were learnt and the security agencies have adopted a multi-agency approach that is more coordinated, timely and effective.

Over time, the country has also witnessed the establishment of special military and police units including the Administration Police Service’ Special Operations Group (SOG).

Unlike the Westgate attack, the DusitD2 attack of January 15, 2019 that claimed 21 lives and left about 28 others injured saw a faster, coordinated and more successful response. The attack, commonly referred to as Badru Nairobi Operation, was a turning point in the manner in which the security agencies shared intelligence and responded to subsequent attacks among other things.

Though there was sufficient intelligence on the planned terror attack, the security agencies not only failed to thwart it but also to conduct a coordinated and swift response to the attack.

The attack that lasted four days raised critical concerns, including the inability of the officers to respond immediately after the attack, the lack of a clear policy on how to respond to such attacks, and lack of uniform information exchange among the various agencies. In the confusion, an officer became a victim of a friendly fire.

There has also been improved intelligence sharing within and across security agencies; better coordination of security agencies and public involvement and support for better policing.

Within minutes of the attack, the specialized units had been deployed and had put the terrorists on defence. The operation lasted only two days and all the terrorists were killed, thanks to a swift and coordinated response through clear policies.

The Westgate and the DusitD2 Hotel attack in January 2019, for example, are replete with major differences. In the subsequent attacks, including the DusitD2, there were no cases of friendly fire, thanks to the coordination. In Westgate, communication was not only poor and unreliable but there were also cases where false information was passed.

However, hours into the attack, the terrorist group had claimed responsibility via its official X (formerly Twitter) handle. The multi-agency team in the subsequent attacks have presented unified position of the government and this has gone a long way in warding off confusion and ensure fake information is not spread.

The information from the Interior Ministry regarding the Westgate attack was not accurate, consistent and timely. This compromised the credibility and reputation of the government.

The country has also enhanced its relation and cooperation with other countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark and other countries in terms of joint operations and trainings, weapons, logistics and intelligence supports.

Kenya is also a willing US partner in counterterrorism investigation, prosecution, and incident response, while the Danish government has also played key roles in providing legal advice and training in issues to terrorism.

In 2018, Kenya and the US entered an agreement to provide the country with U.S. Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS-G) software, which facilitates screening of air travellers.

To deal with unchecked entry into Kenya by foreign nationals’ due factors like porous border, the government has also launched the Border Security and Control curriculum as one of the measures to bolster security at the points of entry and exit in the country and ensure public safety.

The Border Control and Coordination Operations Committee (BCOCC) seeks to secure the borders from threats while welcoming all legitimate travelers and commerce and ensure public safety.

According to the Interior Ministry, the multi-agency approach has seen crimes including terrorism, human and drug trafficking, smuggling and other transnational organised crimes reduce.

There had also been increases in civilian knowledge on how to respond during attacks which made it possible for the rescue operation to save more civilians. Apart from joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in August 2018, the country has also put in place dozens of measures to deal with terror in the country.

One of them was the strengthening of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) mandate regarding counterterrorism-related interagency coordination.

Kenya also established interagency Joint Operations Centers at several points of entry and border crossings to promote information sharing. The other strategy is adopting a collaborative approach for investigations and prosecution of corruption, terrorism, terrorism financing and money laundering cases among other crimes.

The initiatives seek to leverage resources and expertise while improving the ability to detect, prevent, and effectively investigate such crimes.

Equally, the private security guards also now embrace multi-agency, bridging the missing link.

An analysis concluded the private security guards were major players in the industry and needed to be embraced.

The approach has since enabled security officers drawn from different agencies to collaborate, leading to a significant improvement in the state of security in the country.